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Abstract
Human decision-making is driven by subjective values assigned to alternative choice options. These valuations are based on
reward cues. It is unknown, however, whether complex reward cues, such as brand logos, may bias the neural encoding of
subjective value in unrelated decisions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we subliminally
presented brand logos preceding intertemporal choices. We demonstrated that priming biased participants’ preferences
towards more immediate rewards in the subsequent temporal discounting task. This was associated with modulations of
the neural encoding of subjective values of choice options in a network of brain regions, including but not restricted to
medial prefrontal cortex. Our findings demonstrate the general susceptibility of the human decision making system to
apparently incidental contextual information. We conclude that the brain incorporates seemingly unrelated value
information that modifies decision making outside the decision-maker’s awareness.
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Introduction
Every time we go shopping, we are confronted with a huge
number of products to choose from. The modern consumer’s
conundrum is the impact on the human reward system of the
plethora of brand logos that are aimed at influencing purchasing
decisions. Of fundamental importance is to understand how reward
cues associated with a brand can influence the neural encoding of
subjective values in reward- and decision-related regions of the
human brain. Understanding the effect of brands as complex cues
that aredesigned to influenceour decision-making is an increasingly
important topic inthe cognitiveneuroscienceofeconomicbehavior.
A number of models have been proposed to explain how brands
impact on consumer behavior, e.g. by changing attitudes or
emotions [1–3]. However, the mechanisms of branding still remain
poorly understood [4]. In particular, it is unclear whether the effect
of brands is limited to product-related purchase decisions or
whether it can generalize to other incidental economic decisions.
The latter would be expected if strong brands acted as reward cues
and stimulated the desire for more reward. Preliminary support for
this hypothesis comes from neuroimaging studies, which have
shown that reward cues, including culturally salient brands, activate
brain structures linked to reward processing [5–9]. The question
remains though whether brand logos can also change the encoding
of reward values in the brain for incidental economic decisions.
The reward value of different choice options is rarely based on
reward size alone but instead reflects other attributes, such as the
probability of receiving the reward, the delay before the reward is
available,aswellastheindividual’sattitudes,motivational state,and
past experiences [10,11]. A common task to study the encoding of
subjective values of rewards in the brain is temporal discounting in
which participants are asked to choose between a smaller, sooner
reward and a larger, later reward [12–17]. Rather than always
choosing the (objectively higher) delayed reward, participants trade
off reward size and delay [18,19]. By varying reward sizes of the
choice options, the task elicits individual indecision points at which the
smaller, soonerreward and the larger,laterrewardareequallylikely
to be chosen. Thus, the indecision point characterizes individuals’
intertemporal preferences. It also provides a measure of suscepti-
bility to brand influence if priming with a brand leads to a shift in
preferences. Temporal discounting therefore constitutes a well-
suited task to study the influence of brands on incidental economic
decisions. Neuroimaging studies using temporal discounting tasks
have demonstrated that the subjective value of choice options is
encoded in a brain network including medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), posterior parietal cortex (PPC), anterior and posterior
cingulate cortex (ACC, PCC) and the ventral striatum (VS) [12,14–
16,20]. Thus, these regions were the most likely candidates for an
influence of brand cues on the neural encoding of subjective values.
Several studies have found that reward cues can directly
influence goal pursuit, even in the absence of conscious processing
[21–23], and that they can bias intertemporal preferences towards
immediate reward options over those available in the future
[24,25] and vice versa [17]. Additionally, subliminally presented
brand logos can bias valuations and choices, even when the
decisions are unrelated to the cue itself [26–29]. Thus, subliminal
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without making the objective of the study obvious to the
participants which, in turn, could provoke undesired reflective or
opposing behavior.
In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we
investigated the neural basis of the unconscious influence of
rewarding brand logos by subliminally presenting either an image
of the corporate brand logo of Apple Inc. (reward cue) or an image
of a cup (neutral cue) to participants before they made a temporal
discounting decision [14,15,20] (Fig. 1; see Materials and
Methods). We chose the Apple logo for this study because
according to market research, the Apple brand has been one of the
most valuable consumer brands (http://www.millwardbrown.
com/BrandZ). Furthermore, the Apple logo has been shown to
create strong consumer-brand relationships and shape consumer
behavior [2], suggesting the potential for a priming effect.
Additionally, we obtained a priming effect with this stimulus in a
separate study (unpublished data). We aimed to determine
whether the brand logos would bias decision outcomes, even
though the brand logo’s domain was not related to the decisions.
In line with other studies using strong reward cues [24], we
hypothesised that priming with the brand logo would increase
impulsive decision-making and lead to steeper discounting of
future rewards.
Moreover, we aimed to identify brain regions in which the
encoding of subjective value was modulated by the unrelated
subliminal reward cue. In particular, we hypothesized that if
brands impacted on the state of the reward system in general, our
reward cues would influence the neural encoding of subjective
values in a broad range of reward- and decision-related regions,
e.g. medial prefrontal cortex, the striatum, anterior and posterior
cingulate cortex and posterior parietal cortex. If brands unfolded
their effect only during later stages of the decision process, an
influence on the encoding of subjective value computation would
be restricted to areas that explicitly encoded decision outcomes. In
order to determine which areas were directly decision-related, we
additionally used multivariate pattern classification methods [30–
33] to search for brain regions that encoded decision outcomes.
Results
Brand relationship, stimulus awareness, and
responsiveness
The brand attitude survey administered after the scanning
session showed that participants had a positive relationship with
the Apple brand. The responses were (on a 7-point rating scale
from 1=‘‘not at all’’ to 7=‘‘very’’): ‘‘When I think of electronic
products such as MP3 players, mobile phones, or computers, this
brand is one of the first brands that comes to mind: [Apple logo]’’
(MSalience 6 SE=5.6160.24); ‘‘I love this brand: [Apple logo]’’
(MLove=4.9260.29); ‘‘I would like to own one or more products of
this brand: [Apple logo]’’ (MDesire=5.6260.37); ‘‘I plan to buy
one or more products of this brand in the next 6 months: [Apple
logo]’’ (MIntent=3.9260.42) (for individual results see Table S1).
Figure 1. Stimuli and experimental paradigm. In each temporal discounting (TD) trial, a prime stimulus (Apple logo or neutral cup) was
presented for 16 ms, flanked by two masks. The pre-mask was shown for 84 ms followed by a blank screen for 16 ms. The post-mask was shown for
400 ms, consisting of 4 slightly different versions, flickered for 100 ms each. The post-mask was further preceded by a blank screen for 16 ms, used to
achieve optimal masking. During perceptual control (PC) trials, the prime stimulus was replaced by an additional blank screen (16 ms). Participants
had to choose between two choice alternatives, presented randomly on either side of the screen. They indicated their choice by pressing a response
button with their left or right thumb. For TD decisions, they had to choose between $20 now and a higher amount of money at some delay (shown
on left side in the figure). For PC decisions, participants were asked to decide on which side the red cross appeared (shown on right side). The
response period lasted 4000 ms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034155.g001
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rewarding than the supposedly neutral cup prime, we conducted a
control experiment with an independent sample of 33 subjects (10
female, MAge=22.4, range: 20–25). Subjects were presented with
an image of the Apple logo and the cup (as used in the fMRI study)
and had to rate statements about these images on a 7-point scale
(from 1=‘‘not at all’’ to 7=‘‘very’’; for full list of statements see
caption of Fig. 2). The results confirmed that the Apple logo was
indeed considered more rewarding than the cup (t(32)=3.17,
p,0.01), was liked more (t(32)=5.09, p,0.001), and was
considered more exciting (t(32)=5.36, p,0.001). The Apple logo
also made subjects think of shopping more than the cup
(t(32)=6.50, p,0.001), and participants wanted Apple products
more than the cup (t(32)=4.59, p,0.001) (see Fig. 2). We further
confirmed with two independent visibility tests that the primes
were presented subliminally. In both tests, only one of the
participant’s 95%-confidence interval of d9 did not contain zero,
an indication that their performance was not significantly different
from chance. Additionally, no participant’s performance was
different from chance in both tests, making it unlikely that primes
were visible (see Table S2).
Participants chose the immediate reward in 43.9% of all trials
(SD=14.2), accompanied by overall balanced motor responses
(MLeft=48.8%). Temporal discounting decisions were significantly
slower than perceptual control decisions on average (MRT TD 6
SD=15646287 ms; MRT PC=6906157 ms; t(15)=10.68;
p,0.001). Easy decisions were significantly faster than difficult
decisions (MRT Easy=1,5136293 ms; MRT Difficult=
1,6156292 ms; t(15)=3.66, p,0.01). No differences in RT were
found between Apple trials (MRT Apple=1,5626285 ms) and
neutral cup trials (MRT Cup=1,5626292 ms; t(15)=20.19,
p=ns).
Discounting behavior and priming
Participants’ average discount rates k were computed by fitting
the model in equation (I) (Mk=0.02460.018). We investigated
whether participants discounted delayed rewards differently when
primed with the Apple logo by fitting a model which considers a
prime-related ‘premium’ (a) in the discount factor (equation III).
Nine (out of 13) participants displayed a positive ‘premium’, that
is, they discounted delayed rewards more when primed with the
Apple logo compared to the neutral condition (Ma=0.0660.31)
(see Fig. 3). On average, participants needed to receive $1.17 more
for the ‘later’ option (at a delay of 180 days) in order to be
indifferent between immediate and delayed rewards. The priming
model fit the data better than the standard discounting model, as
confirmed by likelihood ratio tests at individual level (p,0.05 for
nine participants; comparisons of AIC/BIC confirm the better fit
of the priming model; see Table S3 for parameter estimates and
for model comparison results), and there was a significant priming
effect as captured by parameter a in Equation (III) both, at
individual level (p,0.05 for nine participants, see Table S3) and at
group level (p,0.001, see Table S4). We did not find any
significant correlation between the priming effect and participants’
BIQ scores (reported in Table S1).
Priming-related modulation of brain activation
Given that priming impacted on choice behavior, our main aim
was to identify brain regions that were modulated by the priming
effect on SV. First, we conceptualized the priming effect as a
parametric interaction of SV and priming, independent of the
general parametric effect of SV (‘priming interaction model’, see
Materials and Methods). We found that this interaction effect
modulated activation in a bilateral network containing anterior
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) extending to frontopolar cortex
(FPC, Zmax=4.83, MNI -12 48 4), medial orbito-frontal cortex
(mOFC; Zmax=4.76, MNI -4 48 -16), the intraparietal sulcus (IPS,
Zmax=4.64, MNI -40 -56 32; Zmax=3.66, MNI 36 -52 28),
posterior cingulate cortex (PPC, Zmax=4.79, MNI -12 -52 40),
caudate nucleus/nucleus accumbens (Zmax=5.02, MNI 0 8 -12),
inferior temporal sulcus (ITS, Zmax=4.72, MNI -64 -44 -4;
Zmax=5.58, MNI 60 -36 -12), and medial occipito-temporal sulcus
(mOTS, Zmax=4.11, MNI -20 -36 -16; Zmax=4.24, MNI 24 -32 -
16) (see Fig. 4). When the interaction between priming and SV was
factored out, only a small cluster in the thalamus (Zmax=3.88,
MNI 20, -12, -12) showed parametric activation for prime-
independent SV (Fig. 4). Thus, most regions that encoded SV were
modulated by the priming effect.
Second, we modeled a parametric priming ‘premium’ (P) for
Apple trials only while treating the neutral cup prime trials as a
baseline (‘priming premium model’, see Materials and Methods). This
priming effect was found to modulate activation in mPFC
(Zmax=4.55, MNI 8 60 4), bilateral supplementary motor areas
(SMA, Zmax=4.22, MNI -8 -8 68; Zmax=4.07, MNI 60 -20 44),
and motor cortices (Zmax=4.07, MNI -56 -16 32; Zmax=5.37,
MNI 20 -16 48) (Fig. 4). This could also be replicated when only
correctly predicted trials (based on individually estimated discount
rates) were used. Results are reported for a statistical threshold of
p,0.05 (FWE corrected for clusters).
In the non-parametric whole-brain analyses, no brain region
was found to directly differ in activation between prime conditions.
Additionally, we used all 16 regions, which showed a parametric
effect for SV in any of the priming models reported above, as
Figure 2. Evaluation of prime. An independent sample of 33
subjects (10 female; MAge=22.4; range: 20–25) were presented with
images of the Apple logo and the cup as used in the fMRI study. They
rated several statements about the images from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very).
Like=‘‘How much do you like this image?’’; Rewarding=‘‘How
rewarding do you find the image above?’’; Exciting=‘‘How exciting
do you find the image above?’’; Relaxing=‘‘How relaxing do you find
this image?’’; Shopping=‘‘Does the image above make you think of
shopping?’’; Like=‘‘How much would you like an Apple product/the
cup?’’. Displayed are average responses and standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034155.g002
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three example participants. The panels in the bottom row show participants’ discount functions by condition (Apple/neutral), displaying the
behavioral priming effect.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034155.g003
Figure 4. Regions in which activation for temporal discounting decisions was parametrically modulated by subjective value (SV).
Using two parametric orthogonal regressors for SV and for the trial-by-trial interaction of priming and SV (see Materials and Methods), several regions
were identified displaying the interaction, independent from general SV (‘priming interaction model’; displayed in yellow). These were anterior mPFC/
ACC, mOFC, left PCC, the caudate nucleus/nucleus accumbens, inferior temporal sulcus, the IPS (not displayed) and medial occipito-temporal sulcus
(not displayed). The only region, which encoded only SV but was not modulated by priming was the left thalamus (displayed in green). Regions
displaying specific Apple prime modulation (‘priming premium model’; see Materials and Methods) of SV encoding were anterior mPFC, bilateral
premotor cortex, and motor cortices (displayed in cyan). For MNI coordinates and statistics refer to main text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034155.g004
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cluster threshold). We repeated the non-parametric control
analyses for these ROIs. Again, none of these regions showed
significant differences between priming conditions (p.0.05,
corrected for multiple comparisons). This suggests that the priming
effect was more accurately captured by the ‘priming interaction model’
and the ‘priming premium model’. All regions involved in the temporal
discounting task, as revealed by the univariate control analyses,
can be found in Table S5.
Decoding of primes and decision outcomes
We also used a ‘searchlight’ variant of multivariate pattern
classification [32] to decode decision components from spatial
activation patterns (p,0.05 FWE corrected cluster threshold). Left
anterior mPFC/ACC (accuracy 56%, SE=0.17, MNI -20 40 12)
and visual cortex (accuracy 58%, SE=0.49, MNI -16 -99 8)
encoded the specific prime condition (Apple vs. neutral cup),
confirming that subliminal prime information was present in high-
level decision areas (Fig. 5). Decoding accuracies in other brain
regions, such as the ventral striatum were comparable (accuracy
56%, SE=0.86, MNI -1 8 -12) but did not exceed the strict
statistical threshold. Decision outcomes (‘now’ vs. ‘later’) were found
to be encoded in right anterior medial orbito-frontal cortex
(mOFC; accuracy 58%, MNI 36 36 12; four participants were
excluded from this particular analysis because of unbalanced
decision outcomes) (Fig. 5). Using smaller ‘searchlight’ clusters
(radius=2 voxels) confirmed the results and additionally showed a
significant cluster in the left insula (accuracy 55%, MNI -24 -4 16).
Finally, decoding decision difficulty (‘easy’ vs. ‘hard’ decisions as
defined by the distance to the individual indifference points, see
Materials and Methods) revealed a cluster in left anterior mPFC
(accuracy 61%, MNI -8 60 8), overlapping with the cluster being
modulated by SV (Fig. 5). It encoded decision difficulty for both
Apple primes (accuracy 57%, MNI -12 60 8) and neutral cup trials
(accuracy 54%, MNI -12 60 8; two unbalanced subjects with $1
run with ,4 trials per choice in both conditions were excluded for
this analysis). For the neutral cup condition, right mPFC (accuracy
59%, MNI 8 56 32) additionally encoded decision difficulty (see
Table S6); this, however, was simply due to general activation
differences at single-voxel level between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ trials for
the neutral cup condition in this region (see Table S7). Note that if
many voxels in a given region show strong activation differences
between conditions, then the local patterns in this region
necessarily differ as well and the advantage of multivariate analysis
vanishes. All results could again be replicated using a searchlight
radius of r=2 voxels. Results are reported for a statistical
threshold of p,0.05 (FWE corrected for clusters).
Discussion
In the present study we have shown that subliminal priming
with a corporate brand logo influenced subsequent unrelated
choices in a temporal discounting task. We further showed that
priming with the brand logo affected the encoding of reward
values of choice options in anterior mPFC. Several additional
brain regions, including the striatum, ACC, mOFC, and posterior
parietal areas were further modulated by the interaction of
priming and subjective value (SV) on a trial-by-trial basis.
Furthermore, our analyses demonstrated that information about
the prime stimuli, decision difficulty, and decision outcomes was
encoded in mPFC and mOFC, suggesting an involvement in
making the final decision. Thus, the effect of brand priming was
evident but not restricted to medial prefrontal decision areas.
Rather, brands acting as complex reward cues appear to influence
a wide range of reward- and decision related brain regions.
Given a choice between a smaller, immediately available reward
and a larger, delayed reward, the relative value of the immediately
available reward is modulated by both delay and magnitude of the
delayed reward, independent of whether the rewards are primary
such as fruit juice, or secondary such as money [14–16,34,35].
Previous studies have identified brain regions that contribute to
this type of intertemporal decision-making. Inferior prefrontal
cortex (PFC), medial PFC, temporal-parietal cortex, and peri-
splenial PCC have been suggested to be involved in task
components such as memory retrieval, planning, and cognitive
control [20]. Other regions including mPFC, OFC, the ventral
striatum, anterior insula, and PCC have been found to be
particularly sensitive to value [14,36–38]. In line with these
studies, we found neural correlates of SV in a set of regions
including mPFC/ACC, mOFC, PCC, DLPFC, and striatum. At
Figure 5. Decoding decision aspects and prime conditions. A moving searchlight decoder with a radius of 3 voxels was used to predict
decision aspects from local brain activation patterns (p,0.05 FWE corrected cluster threshold for all). Clusters in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)/
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (peak accuracy 58%) and visual cortex (peak accuracy 58%, not displayed) encoded the prime condition (Apple vs.
neutral cup) for temporal discounting (green). A region in left mPFC/FPC encoded decision difficulty (‘easy’ vs. ‘hard’; peak accuracy 61%; blue). There
was no difference between the Apple condition and the neutral cup condition (p.0.1). The decision outcome (‘now’ vs. ‘later’) could be decoded
from right mOFC (peak accuracy 58%; red) for all TD decisions. More detailed prime-specific analyses could not be performed because seven subjects
were too unbalanced in their binary decision outcomes (see main text). Error bars=SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034155.g005
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brain regions encodes value. One suggestion is that value
representations in different neural populations may contribute to
different mental processes, ranging from automatic value associ-
ations to flexible, goal-directed planning [11,39–41] and that
different brain regions may support separate stages in the decision
making process [42]. Here we could show that wide-spread medial
prefrontal regions encoded decision difficulty, extending to OFC,
which encoded decision outcomes. This supports earlier findings
that linked OFC to the integration of cognitive and emotional
information [43] as well as the encoding of stimulus and reward
values [14,44–46]. Others have shown that decision outcomes in
reward-based decisions [47] and purchasing decisions can be
predicted from signals in mPFC [48]. These reports, together with
our results, suggest a prominent role of medial prefrontal regions
in forming a decision outcome based on value representations.
Note, however, that our study was not designed to disentangle the
temporal information flow during the decision process and
therefore cannot prove that the final decision was formed in
medial prefrontal cortex. This process could also have involved
several other regions while mPFC only represented the final
decision outcomes.
Our main aim was to investigate the neural correlates of the
priming effect. We found that temporal discounting decisions
could be manipulated by subliminally presenting an image of an
unrelated brand logo, which in turn was accompanied by a
systematic shift in the encoding of SV in the brain. Here we show
that priming with a brand logo had an effect on decision-making
even though the prime was unrelated to the decision task, to
subjects’ expectations [49], to strong needs and desires [50], and
was presented subliminally. On the flipside, these features of the
prime might have weakened the priming effect in comparison to
other studies which, in turn, might explain why others find even
stronger priming effects [50]. We identified neural correlates of a
priming ‘premium’ on SV in mPFC. However, this model alone
might not fully capture the priming effect and lead to the wrong
conclusion that priming only affects encoding in high-level
decision areas and subsequent motor regions, which are related
to response execution. Importantly, nearly all regions which
encoded SV were susceptible to priming, including mPFC,
mOFC, caudate nucleus, and PCC [14,20,36,51]. We also found
that not all regions which showed a priming effect on the encoding
of subjective value also directly encoded the priming condition.
This could simply be a problem of statistical power that could be
more severe for smaller brain regions. Another explanation,
however, is that in these regions (including the ventral striatum)
the priming effect was expressed only indirectly by the observed
modulation of subjective value encoding by priming. Thus, both
methods revealed complementary information [32] about tempo-
ral discounting decisions and do not contradict each other. The
combination of parametric analysis, which is more sensitive to
graded variables, and multivariate pattern classification analysis,
which is more sensitive to distinct classes of variables, has been
shown to be highly efficient for dissociating different neural
mechanisms [52].
These findings support the assumption that priming affects the
general state of the reward system by biasing how reward cues are
initially perceived in a trial. Medial PFC might then integrate
representations of decision values which in turn becomes the basis
for choice [53]. Note that our results do not imply (and we do not
conclude) that all regions we found to be affected by priming play
the same role in subjective value processing. Given the poor
temporal resolution of fMRI our study cannot distinguish between
feed-forward and feed-back processing and tracking of the
information flow through this network requires future studies.
We do conclude, however, that the priming effect was not an ‘add-
on’ that occurred only during the final stages of the decision
process.
The precise neural mechanism behind the brand priming effect
on discounting behaviour cannot be resolved with our study alone.
One possibility is that the brand could be regarded as a simple
conditioned stimulus that triggered goal-directed behavior (‘want-
ing’) [54]. Alternatively, the brand prime could have activated a
general goal, or motivational state, related to the desire to
purchase a product. Immediate monetary rewards (steeper
discounting) would facilitate achievement of this goal [25,36].
Such goals or motivational states do not rely on conscious
representations [21,55,56]. Others have shown that tagging the
delayed choice option with words reminding subjects of important
events that will occur at the same time in their future decreased
discounting [17]. This was explained by triggering future-oriented
thinking via episodic memory activation and was accompanied by
differential activation in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), amyg-
dala and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the tagged condition.
The brand primes in our study might have activated episodic
memories related to immediate rewards. Note, however, that other
explanations, such as the involvement of emotions in brand
processing, cannot be ruled out.
We suggest that the reward value attached to the subliminally
presented brand logo systematically biased the value representa-
tion of choices in the decision network. In support of this view, it
has been shown that not only novel and explicitly conditioned
stimuli [57,58] but also cultural objects, related to wealth and
social status, can activate the reward circuit [5]. A brand logo can
substitute for such objects, as reported in a study in which positive
brands led to consumer attachment and strongly affected behavior
[2]. The presentation of brand logos has been shown to engage
reward-encoding brain regions, including ventral striatum and
anterior mPFC [6,8,59]. In our study, presentation of a brand logo
to participants with a strong positive attitude towards the Apple
brand is likely to have activated the reward system, with
immediately available reward alternatives being assigned a higher
relative value. This hypothesis is also supported by our control
study that showed strong associations between the Apple brand
with reward and shopping. These value signals may have been
projected to motor regions, which could explain the prime-related
shift in value representation in motor regions in our study. Our
data, however, does not allow us to determine whether this
information purely serves response preparation or whether there
was a more direct involvement of motor regions in the decision
process itself.
One difficulty of interpretation in this study is that priming
might have affected behavior in a number of ways, suggesting that
the nature of prime-related brain processes may have been
incompletely measured. We addressed this possibility by combin-
ing univariate parametric analysis with multivariate decoding
analysis. Multivariate decoding can detect fine-grained informa-
tion beyond the resolution of the voxel grid [30] and has
previously been used to decode reward-based decisions
[12,44,47,48]. It allowed us to identify regions, which were
directly linked to decision difficulty and decision outcomes. Please
note that this analysis served the purpose of directly predicting
these decision aspects from brain activity patterns, making use of
the high sensitivity of multivariate decoding for information about
distinct classes. The graded encoding of subjective values,
however, was better captured by parametric univariate models.
Thus, both methods revealed complementary information [32]
about temporal discounting decisions and do not contradict each
Rewarding Brand Logos Bias Incidental Decisions
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prime-related ‘premium’ as well as an interaction between priming
and subjective value, both directly derived from behavioral
models. However, we acknowledge that the underlying discount-
ing functions, and potentially also priming effects, may be reflected
differently in brain activity when different tasks are used [12].
We have also assumed that the primes were processed outside of
the participants’ conscious awareness, as confirmed by detailed
debriefing interviews and by the two post-experimental tests that
simulated the viewing conditions in the fMRI experiment. Our
visibility tests provide strong indication that participants did not
consciously perceive the prime images. There is no unanimously
agreed criterion to determine prime visibility though [60] and
residual visibility on single trials can never be ruled out with
absolute certainty. This manipulation allowed us to avoid
participants thinking about the experimental manipulation during
the experiment. Since in the present study prime images were
unrelated to the temporal discounting task, in any case residual
visibility would not challenge the effect of incidental brand primes
on the encoding of value.
It is well known that subliminal primes can affect goal pursuit
[21], attitudes [61] and behavior in many ways [22,23,62]. We
further note that our participants did not dramatically change (or
reverse) their decisions. Subliminal exposure to reward cues may
be more likely to prime a short-lived state (or tendency) that would
nudge decision-makers towards more immediate rewards. We
suggest that this may be one way the brain subserves decision
making in highly complex environments [43,63].
Due to limitations imposed by fMRI, our study was restricted to
the use of one brand logo only and future studies with larger
sample sizes are needed, using a larger set of priming stimuli and
control stimuli to test the generalisation as well as the precise
mechanisms behind our results. Future studies should also
compare to what extent priming stimuli themselves would activate
reward-related brain regions when they are not followed by an
economic decision. In addition, further research is required to
investigate how the brain processes and resolves the dynamic
multiplicity of reward cues that we are exposed to in every-day life,
of which brand logos are just one example. Other studies are
required to investigate how a symbol can become a reward cue
and how cue value may be integrated with the reward values of
choices in decision making.
The findings of our study suggest that the formation of
economic preferences is more complex than traditional models
suggest and is influenced by many factors other than core decision
parameters. Arbitrary symbols, such as corporate brand logos, can
act as strong reward cues and affect decisions outside their initial
domain, and are associated with a systematic bias in the encoding
of reward values in the brain.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
The study was approved by the Economics and Commerce
Human Ethics Advisory Group of The University of Melbourne
(Ethics ID 0830289) and was conducted according to the
Declaration of Helsinki. All subjects gave informed written
consent.
Participants
Eighteen right-handed adults (8 female; MAge=22.9 years;
range=19–29; normal or corrected to normal visual acuity) took
part in the fMRI study. All were selected based on a behavioral
pre-test with a similar task, which was further used to calibrate the
task for the fMRI session. Three participants were excluded
because of technical problems with data recording. Another two
participants’ data were excluded because they almost always chose
the delayed reward. This suggests that they did not make decisions
on a trial-by-trial basis but adopted a default strategy, or that the
task was not calibrated properly. Therefore, we could not fit our
models to these participants’ responses. The final sample
contained 13 participants (6 female, MAge=21.2 years,
range=19–29).
Tasks
Main task. Participants completed temporal discounting
(TD) and perceptual control (PC) trials, presented in random
order. In TD trials, one masked prime image preceded the
presentation of a decision task. The decision involved the choice
between an immediate reward (always ‘$20 today’) and a larger,
later reward, which varied by amount and delay (all in Australian
dollars). Participants were presented with six different delays (1,
10, 21, 55, 90, and 180 days) and six different amounts per delay
(from $20.10 to $385.16), resulting in 36 combinations, each
presented three times during the fMRI session in different runs.
Delayed amounts were chosen individually (based on pre-tests)
such that the expected number of choices of the immediate reward
(‘now’) equaled the expected number of choices of the larger, later
reward (‘later’). Two different types of primes were used. The first
one was the Apple logo in three different colour versions, which
are used by Apple Inc. in branding and advertising. These were
randomly assigned to the ‘Apple prime trials’. The Apple logo was
chosen based on the results of a behavioural study in which it
showed a stronger priming effect than other logos as well as
smiling faces [64]. The second prime was an image of a cup (‘cup
prime trials’) drawn from a realistic object database (Michael J.
Tarr, http://www.tarrlab.org/) and modified to match the Apple
logo versions for color and size. The cup motif was selected as a
neutral prime for its perceived familiarity, comparable visual
complexity, and relative affective neutrality. In TD trials, each
amount-delay combination was combined with each of the two
prime stimuli, resulting in 216 trials in total. A mask displaying a
dense arrangement of colored ellipses was used in order to render
the primes invisible. In the PC task (108 trials) participants had to
respond to the colour of one of two crosses, each presented on
either side of the screen (Fig. 1).
Each trial began with the central presentation of a fixation cross
(2417 ms), followed by a combination of a forward (84 ms) and a
backward mask (400 ms) between which the prime image (16 ms,
additionally flanked by blank screens for 16 ms, respectively) was
shown. Finally, a response screen (RS) was shown (4000 ms),
displaying two choice alternatives ($20 now vs. a larger, delayed
reward) on either side of the screen. Participants indicated their
choice by pressing either the left or right response button on a
response box using their thumbs. Stimulus and response side
combinations were pseudo-randomized for each trial with each
stimulus appearing equally often in each functional run (using
OptSeq; [65]). The dissociation of choice options and response
buttons avoided confounds of decision outcomes and motor
responses. For the PC task, a blank screen (16 ms) replaced the
prime stimulus between the masks and participants were asked to
indicate on which side the red cross appeared on the RS (the other
cross was always white). The sequence was randomized for each
functional run. In each run (duration 378 s) participants were
presented with 54 trials (7000 ms each) controlled by Psychtoolbox
for MATLAB 7.0 (The MathWorks, Inc.). Stimuli were presented
via a projector (resolution 10246768 pixel, 60 Hz) that was placed
at the front-end of the scanner and projected onto a 100675 cm
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projection via a mirror fixed onto the head coil. The visual angle
was 5.0u for all stimuli.
Brand and impulsiveness questionnaires. After the fMRI
sessions,subjects completed a questionnaire to elicittheirrelationship
with the Apple brand. Participants rated statements related to the
Applebrandonascaleform1(stronglydisagree)to7(stronglyagree).
The single scales werethen added up and standardized into a ‘brand-
score’. Additionally, participants completed the Barrett
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, items 1 to 18) using a set of
statements that had to be rated on a scale scale from 1 (Rarely/
Never) to 4 (Almost Always/Always) to assess general impulsiveness
[66].Weadministeredthisinstrumenttotestwhethersusceptibilityto
priming was modulated by individual trait impulsivity.
Visibility tests. Subsequently, participants completed two
visibility tests, using the same masking sequence that was used for
the fMRI experiment. First, a simple detection task was used to
test if participants were able to detect the presence of any stimulus
at all when explicitly paying attention to the stimulation (which
was not the case in the fMRI study). For this, a masked image
(50% Apple logo, 50% neutral cup) was shown in half of the trials
and no image was shown between the masks in the other half.
Subjects were asked to respond ‘yes’ via button press if they saw an
image in between the masks, and ‘no’ otherwise. The second task
tested whether participants could identify any particular image.
One of four possible masked images (Apple logo, the neutral cup,
another corporate logo, and another household object) was shown
in every trial, followed by a response screen showing all four
images. Participants were asked to select the image they believed
themselves to have seen. In Test 1, we counted a ‘yes’ response in a
trial in which an image was presented as a hit, and a ‘yes’ response
in a trial in which no image was presented as a false alarm. In Test
2, we counted the choice of the Apple logo in a trial in which the
Apple logo was presented as a hit, and the choice of the Apple logo
in a trial in which another image was presented as a false alarm.
95% confidence intervals for d9 were bootstrapped by resampling
responses at subject level from the empirical distributions and
computing d9 based on re-sampled responses (n=1000).
Participant payments. Participants received a total of $50
for participating in both the screening session and the fMRI
experiment. In order to make the task incentive-compatible,
participants were given the chance to win one of the choices they
made during each session by rolling a die. On rolling a six, one of
their TD choices was drawn randomly and paid out. If the
participants chose the immediate reward in that trial, they
received $20 in cash. Otherwise, the reward was transferred into
the participant’s bank account after the given delay.
Functional imaging
Functional MRI images were acquired at the Royal Children’s
Hospital (Melbourne, Australia) using a Siemens 3T Magnetom
Trio MRI scanner (Erlangen, Germany) with a standard head coil.
Foam padding around the head was used to reduce head motion.
T2*-weighted functional images of the whole brain were collected
using a gradient-echo, echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence
(TR=2000 ms, TE=35 ms, 32 transverse slices acquired in
ascending interleaved order, 3.663.664m m
3 voxel size, 64664
matrix in a 230 mm field-of-view). Data was acquired in six
functional runs, separated by rest periods of 1 min. During each
run, 189 functional images were recorded. The first two images
were discarded to allow the MR signal to reach a steady state.
Additionally, a high-resolution, T1-weighted anatomical image
was collected for each participant at the beginning of the scanning
session for co-registration (TR=1900 ms, TE=2.59 ms, flip
angle=9u, 92 sagittal slices, 0.860.860.9 mm
3 voxel size,
3386338 matrix in a 270 mm field-of-view).
Data analysis
Behavior. Previous studies have shown that most individuals
discount future rewards hyperbolically, that is, the cost of waiting
increases linearly in the delay [14,67,68]. Thus, a participant’s
subjective value SV of a reward R received in D days was given by
SV~
R
1zkD
ðIÞ
where k is the participant’s discount rate. Given the variability of
participants’ decisions we further assumed that decision errors
have a logistic distribution and that the probability that a
participant chose delayed reward R at delay D over an
immediate reward of 20 was given by
F
R
1zkD
{20

~
1
1ze{v R
1zkD{20
 ðIIÞ
where 1/v is the variance of the logistic distribution. Participants’
discount rates were estimated by fitting a logistic model to their
choices [14], which was found to provide the best fit for our data.
In the first priming model (‘priming premium model’) we assumed
that participants discounted delayed rewards differently when
primed with the Apple logo. We assumed that the subjective
value SV
* of reward R received at delay D was given by
SV ~
R
1zkDzaIA
ðIIIÞ
where a is the ‘premium‘ on the discount rate due to the priming
effect, and IA is a dummy variable for the Apple condition taking
value 1 when the trial is an Apple trial and 0 otherwise. We
estimated parameters k, a, and v in equations (I) and (III) with
maximum likelihood estimation at the subject level. The
‘premium’ on SV induced by priming (P) was computed as the
difference between the priming-induced subjective value (SV
*) and
the subjective value (SV) as follows:
P~SV {SV~
{aIAR
(1zkDzaIA)(1zkD)
ðIVÞ
In a second priming model, we defined the variable S as the
interaction between the priming ‘premium’ (a) and the priming-
induced subjective value (SV
*), referred to as ‘priming interaction model’
S~{a
SV 
1zkD
ðVÞ
Thismodelteststhehypothesisthatthe primingeffectincreaseswith
SV (i.e. is less pronounced at low levels of SV). Besides priming
effects, we additionally analyzed decisions according to other
parameters. First, we defined decision difficulty as a function of the
distance D between the subjective value (SV) of the delayed reward,
and the immediate amount where
D~
R
1zkD
{20
   
    ðVIÞ
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C(D)~
2
1zevD ðVIIÞ
C is bounded by 0 and 1. It increases when the distance D between
the SV of the delayed reward and 20 decreases, and is maximal
when D is zero, that is, when the SV of the delayed reward is equal
to 20 [69]. Parameters k and v in C(D) were estimated in the
maximum likelihood estimation of equation (I). A ‘hard’ decision
was defined as a decision for which the difficulty index C was higher
than the participant’s median difficulty index.
Univariate fMRI analysis. For all analyses, functional
images were first slice-timing corrected, realigned to the first
functional image of the first run, co-registered to the individual
T1-weighted anatomical images, normalized to the MNI template
(as implemented in SPM2; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/)
and re-sampled to an isotropic spatial resolution of 46464m m
3.
Data were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width at
half maximum (FWHM) to account for anatomical variability and
to satisfy the assumption of Gaussian random field theory.
Our main analysis examined the influence of the primes on
brain activation with respect to the encoding of subjective value
(SV). We searched for brain regions in which the encoding of SV
was either influenced by priming or independent from priming.
For this, different general linear models (GLM) were estimated on
an individual subject level that modelled each trial beginning with
the visual presentation to the end of the response period (4500 ms).
For the first model, Apple trials, cup trials, and control trials were
modelled separately. We based our analysis directly on the ‘priming
interaction model’ and estimated the trial-by-trial SV and the priming
effect using equation V (see above) to incorporate an interaction
between SV and the priming effect on the discount rate. This
means, for each temporal discounting trial general SV was
modeled parametrically and the interaction with the priming effect
was included as a second, orthogonalized parametric regressor
(control trials were modelled non-parametrically since these had
no SV). General (prime-independent) SV was factored out in order
to search for regions, which displayed prime-specific encoding of SV.
In an additional analysis, we then reversed the order of parametric
regressors and factored out the interaction with the priming effect
in order to search for regions in which the encoding of SV was not
influenced by priming.
As a second approach, we used a different model, based on the
‘priming premium model’ (equation III, see above) that assumed a
specific priming ‘premium’ for the Apple logo primes. Apple trials,
cup trials, and control trials were again modelled separately with
SV incorporated as a parametric regressor (of no interest) and
factored out for each TD trial. For Apple prime trials only, a
parametric Apple-specific regressor was incorporated and orthog-
onalized to the SV regressor to test for modulation of brain activity
specifically related to the Apple prime. A cluster significance
threshold of p,0.05 (FWE corrected) was used for all group-level
statistical analyses. Taken together, these analyses independently
tested for neural correlates of both behavioural priming-models as
well as for non-modulated SV encoding.
These analyses were further supported by several control
analyses in which TD decisions were contrasted against baseline
as well as against PC decisions. For this, a general linear model
(GLM) was estimated on an individual subject level that modelled
each trial as belonging to one of the two decision tasks (TD and
PC). Furthermore, TD decision trials were modelled as belonging
to Apple trials and cup prime trials, resulting in 3 boxcar
regressors. The mean activation differences between prime
conditions were based on analyses for the whole brain as well as
for individual regions of interests (ROIs), which were constructed
using the group-level baseline contrast for parametric modulation
of general (prime-independent) SV encoding. In further control
analyses, we additionally estimated models incorporating regres-
sors for the decision outcomes (‘now’ vs. ‘later’) and decision
difficulty (‘easy’ vs. ‘hard’) for TD trials within the two prime
conditions separately.
Multivariate fMRI analysis. We additionally used
multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA; [30,33]) to predict the
prime condition, decision outcomes and decision difficulty for TD trials.
In order to search for predictive regions throughout the whole
brain in an unbiased, non-circular fashion, we ran ‘searchlight’
decoding analyses [32].
The functional images were first pre-processed using slice-
timing correction and motion correction. Further normalization
and spatial smoothing was not performed in order to preserve as
much of the original information in the data as possible [30]. For
each analysis, a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) model was
estimated (as implemented in SPM2), which requires few
assumptions about the exact shape of the BOLD response and
therefore preserves more information in the data [70–72]. A high-
pass filter with a cut-off of 128 s removed low frequency drifts in
the time series at each voxel. The model subdivided each trial into
six distinct time bins of 2000 ms (=1 TR) covering a total of
12000 ms in order to capture all trial-related activation, taking
into account the hemodynamic delay. The first time point (t=0)
was defined as the beginning of the image acquired at the start of
the visual stimulation (4500 ms). For each time bin, the cortical
response was estimated separately by one parameter (for details see
[70]). For decoding of the prime condition, Apple and cup prime
trials were modelled separately, resulting in 2 (type)66 (time
bins)=12 regressors for each run and each subject. MVPAs were
run on all n possible searchlight-clusters for all six time bins. A
radius of r=3 voxels was used to define spherical searchlight-
clusters with k voxels (c1…k) surrounding each central voxel (vi…n)
[48,72]. The FIR-parameter estimates for the voxels from each
cluster were extracted separately for both prime conditions at a
given time bin for each run and each participant and then
transformed into pattern vectors (for illustrations see [30,70]).
Starting with the first cluster around voxel vi, the pattern vectors
from all but one functional run were used as a ‘training data-set’
and passed to a linear support vector machine (SVM) classifier
[73] with a fixed regularisation parameter C=1 (using LIBSVM
2.91, [74]). Based on the ‘training data-set’ the classifier estimated
a classification hyperplane to separate patterns from both
conditions. This hyperplane was then tested by classifying the
pattern vectors from the independent, left-out functional run (‘test
data-set’). Please note that the classifier operated on pattern
vectors based on average regressors for each condition and not on
single trials. This avoided potentially biasing the classification by
small run-by-run variations in trial numbers per condition, as
naturally occurs for decision tasks. It also means that there was
always one vector for each condition with balanced training and
test data-sets for each run and chance level was always 50% for
two alternatives. The quality of the classification, denoted as the
decoding accuracy, was calculated by averaging across six cross-
validation steps, using each run as the independent ‘test data-set’
once. This procedure also controlled for over-fitting and false-
positives [12,48]. The classification analysis was then repeated for
each cluster in the brain (separately for each time bin), resulting in
a three-dimensional brain map of decoding accuracy values for
each time bin, individually for each participant. These maps were
then normalized to MNI space and smoothed with a Gaussian
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effects group-level statistical analyses as used by us and others
[44,48,70–72], using a cluster significance threshold of p,0.05
(FWE corrected). Taking into account the delay in the hemody-
namic response, only the last two time bins were statistically
analysed because earlier time bins could not reflect trial-related
activity [12]. Using a similar FIR model, we confirmed that no
stimulation-related visual activity was found in earlier time bins (by
means of univariate analysis) and that no decision-related
information could be decoded from time bins 1 to 4. We also
replicated all decoding analyses based on GLMs, which modelled
the HRF instead of using FIR models [48]. The results entirely
confirmed the reported findings (however, sometimes at lower
significance thresholds) and did not reveal additional predictive
regions; these results are not reported here.
In the same way, we decoded different aspects of participants’
decisions from local spatial activation patterns. Three independent
analyses were conducted to decode a) the priming condition (Apple vs.
neutral cup), b) the decision outcomes for TD decisions (‘now’ vs.
‘later’) and c) the decision difficulty for TD decisions (‘easy’ vs.
‘hard’). The only difference between these analyses was that
different regressors were estimated as the basis for subsequent
decoding. In order to control for potential biases and smaller brain
structures [48], we replicated all analyses using a searchlight radius
of 2 voxels.
Finally, we conducted multivariate pattern classification anal-
yses within prime conditions separately. Note that for the latter
analyses with half of the trials per condition, decoding of decision
outcomes could not be performed for prime conditions separately
because of the small number of trials per condition.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Questionnaire responses. Note: Sbj=subject.
Ratings from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Salience=‘‘When I think of electronic products such as MP3
players, mobile phones, or computers, this brand is one of the first
brands that comes to mind: [Apple logo]’’; Love=‘‘I love this
brand: [Apple logo]’’; Own=‘‘I own one or more products of this
brand: [Apple logo]’’; Desire=‘‘I would like to own one or more
products of this brand: [Apple logo]’’; Intent=‘‘I plan to buy one
or more products of this brand in the next 6 months: [Apple
logo]’’; BIQ=sum of BIS-11 Attention, Motor, and Self-Control
factor scores.
(DOCX)
Table S2 Results of visibility tests. Note: The table shows
d9 for the two visibility test as well as bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals of d9. In Test 1 (2AFC prime vs. control blank screens), a
hit was defined as a ‘yes’ response in a trial in which a prime was
displayed and a false alarm was defined as a ‘yes’ response in a trial
in which no prime was displayed. In Test 2 (4AFC), a hit was
defined as an ‘Apple’ response in a trial in which the Apple logo
was displayed and a false alarm was defined as an ‘Apple’ response
in a trial in which a different prime was displayed. Confidence
intervals were bootstrapped at subject-level by resampling
responses from the empirical distributions and computing d9
based on resampled responses (n=1000). Two of the participants,
marked
# in the table above, did not have any hits in the Apple
condition and d9 could not be computed.
(DOCX)
Table S3 Comparison of baseline model and priming
model. (a) Parameter estimates. Note: Sbj=subject; k=discount
rate; SE=standard error of parameter estimate; omega=recipro-
cal of the variance of logistic distribution; a=priming premium.
For equations and details see Materials and Methods. (b) Model
comparison. Note: Sbj=subject; B=baseline model (equation I);
P=priming premium model (equation III); D=P – B; p(LR)=p-
value of likelihood ratio test; AIC=Akaike Information Criterion;
BIC=Bayesian Information Criterion.
(DOCX)
Table S4 Mixed-effects model of priming effect. Note:
The table above shows estimates of fixed effects in a non-linear
mixed effects model of participants’ choices at group level based
on Equation (III). Standard errors of coefficient estimates are given
in brackets.
*** p,0.001;
** p,0.01;
* p,0.05.
(DOCX)
Table S5 Baseline contrasts for univariate analyses.
Notes: Temp. Disc.=temporal discounting decisions; Control=-
perceptual control decisions; SV param=parametric effect for
general subjective value (no priming effect accounted for); L=left;
R=right; clusters determined by Z value.1.96 and a family-wise
error (FWE) corrected cluster significance threshold of p,0.05;
coordinates are given in MNI space. Please note that the perceptual
controltask also activated parts of the same network as the temporal
discounting task and thus did not constitute an optimal task to
isolate regions that were uniquely involved in discounting.
(DOCX)
Table S6 Results decoding decision aspects. Note:
TD=temporal discounting decisions; L=left; R=right;
M=mean; SEM=standard error of mean; apple=Apple prime
condition; cup=neutral cup prime condition; mPFC=medial
prefrontal cortex; ant=anterior; inf=inferior; DLPFC=dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex; FPC=frontopolar cortex; temp=temporal;
sulc=sulcus; gyr=gyrus; ‘#’ 2 subjects excluded because of
unbalanced runs for both prime conditions (n=11); all results
p,0.05 family-wise error (FWE) corrected at cluster level; all
analyses performed using unbiased searchlight decoding with
radius r=3 voxels. Coordinates are given for peak voxel in MNI
space.
(DOCX)
Table S7 Differential contrasts univariate analyses.
Note: TD=temporal discounting decisions; Cup=neutral cup
prime condition; L=left; R=right; clusters determined by Z
value.1.96 and a family-wise error (FWE) corrected cluster
significance threshold of p,0.05; coordinates are given in MNI
space. Other contrasts (hard.easy; cup.apple; apple.cup; apple-
hard.apple-easy;apple-easy.apple-hard;cup-hard.cup-easy)did
not reveal significant results. Interestingly, easy choices led to more
activation in anterior mPFC compared to hard decisions. This
might reflect that easier decisions could be based on unambiguous
value representations, which could facilitate the decision process.
This interpretation, however, remains to be tested in future studies.
(DOCX)
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